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In  Europe  several  countries  adopt  different  incentive  schemes  to  increase  regional 
development. Some subsidies are targeted to small and medium enterprises, others to large 
enterprises.  Even  if  the  subsidies  are  targeted  to  specific  industrial  aspects,  there  is  a 
substantial degree of territorial overlapping among them.  
Generally, every incentive scheme operates in isolation, and the evaluation of the different 
measures does not take into account the presence of complementarities or substitution among 
them. On the other hand, the presence of the SME and large firms in the same area can 
generate positive externalities: this can explain the integration of different incentive schemes 
on the same region. The aim of this paper is to explore the impact of SME (Small Medium 
Enterprises)    and  large  project  incentive  schemes  in  two  cases:  in  areas  where  financial 
assistance has been taken up by SME and large firms, and in areas where only SME are 
subsidized. 
The analysis is based on the two major measures for local development in Italy: incentives by 
Law 488/92, mainly devoted to SME, and contratti di programma  (program  agreements), 
created for large projects. Using data for 365 local labour systems in the South of Italy, we 
estimate the employment effect of subsidies, conditioning to the presence of spontaneous 
local growth patterns and for spatial spillovers, using appropriate spatial models. The analysis 
shows  that incentives for  SME  have  higher  impacts  in area  where  a  project  financed  by 
program agreement is located. This suggests the presence of a relevant level of empirical 
complementarities between the two incentive measures. 
 
JEL: J23, R58, R11  
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1. Introduction 
 
In Italy, as well as in other European countries, several measures for local development are 
oriented to private capital subsidies. The most important incentive schemes are Law 488/92, 
providing    subsidies  to  small  and  medium  enterprise  projects,  and  program  agreements, 
focused on large investment projects. Although both instruments have a common dimension, 
related to target, area of implementation and  recipients, they are implemented in an isolated 
context, without explicit elements of integration. Also evaluation studies of local development 
policies rarely tackle the simultaneous presence of different instruments applied to the same 
area.  
 
There are several reasons why the joined impacts of several instruments on the same region 
differ  from  the  sum  of  individual  impacts.  For  example,  the  territorial  concentration  of 
different  policies  could  promote  local  aggregations  of  firms,  generating  positive  local 
agglomeration  externalities
2  .  Moreover,  the  joint  use  of  different  policy  instruments  can 
facilitate  the  location  of  local  systems  of  enterprises  organized  by  hierarchical  relations, 
whereas  large  firms  are  linked  to  smaller  ones  by  vertical  relations  (subforniture, 
externalisation).
3 Finally, the use of a set of instruments can improve the matching between 
firm needs and incentive supplies.  
 
The presence of such positive effects is basically an empirical matter. Therefore, the aim of 
this paper is to evaluate the simultaneous impact of instruments of subsidies when operating 
in the same area. The estimated effects include both the impact of the distinct instruments, 
evaluated in terms of creation of new jobs, as well as the presence of complementarity or 
substitution effects between them. 
 
The analysis is carried out over at a very disaggregated territorial level, using the grid of  the 
local labour system (LLS, territorial unit), in the South of Italy. This allows the analysis of 
spill over effects between LLS, that  are estimated through an econometric model with spatial 
dependence. The analysis uses non-experimental statistical evaluation methods, based on a 
modified  version  of  the  difference-in-differences  model,  to  assess  the  impact  of  public 
subsidies in regions of different dimensions. 
  
The literature about quantitative evaluation of regional effects of industrial aid schemes to 
firms is not very wide.   Some studies, encouraged  by the availability of the data, used 
statistical methods to evaluate the impact of Enterprise Zone Programs, US incentive schemes 
to firms located in disadvantaged areas (for example Bondonio, 1998, Bondonio and Engberg, 
1999). In Italy, subsidies impact studies based on quantitative methods in the South of Italy and 
in  depressed  areas  have  considered  both  micro  (on  firms)  and  macro  (on  a  specific  area) 
aspects. The analyses have implied both  Law 488/92 (for example Del Monte, 1997; Chiri, 
Pellegrini and Sappino, 1998; Pellegrini, 1999; Ministery  of Industry, 2000, Scalera e Zazzero, 
2002; Ministery  of Productive Activities , 2003; Carlucci and Pellegrini, 2003, Bondonio, 
2004) and program agreements (Giunta, 1998; Florio e Giunta, 2002; De Castris, 2003). On the 
other hand, none of the previous essays considered the interaction of different instruments, that 
is the main innovation presented in this paper.  
 
The paper is divided into the following parts: in the second section a brief review of the two 
incentive schemes (Program Agreements and Law 488/92) is presented; in the third one the 
                                                
2 See Rosenthal and Strange (2004) for a recent review on agglomeration economies. 
3 See Markusen (1996a) and (1996b) for evidence on hierarchical districts    3 
analysis of the spatial distribution of the instruments, evaluating overlapping, concentration 
and spatial correlation, is described; in the fourth one we illustrate the methodological aspects 
of  our  analysis  and  describe  the  econometric  model  we  used.  In  the  fifth  one  data  and 
statistical source are presented, and in the following one results of the estimate. The last 
section is dedicated to the conclusions of our analysis. 
 
2. Industrial aid schemes in the South of Italy: the Law 488/92 and program agreements 
 
The incentive policies to firms in the South of Italy are oriented to sustain the accumulation of 
private capital and to support employment growth. In Italy a first change in aid policies was 
introduced by the Law 64/1986. This law represents not only the end of the well-known 
“Cassa  per  il  Mezzogiorno”,  a  State  Agency  devoted  to  the  management  of  financial 
resources to develop Southern Italy infrastructures and private capital. It has introduced  the 
“planned negotiation”, where the definition of  investments is the objective of a negotiation 
between the Public Administration (mainly Regions and Central Administrations) and firms. 
The planned negotiation has changed the relations between public institutions and private 
economic operators because it substitutes a more constructive and horizontal approach for a 
hierarchical one. This approach is   oriented not only to the sharing of resources but basically 
to the identification and conclusion of public investments. 
One of the different new instruments developed in the framework of planned negotiation was 
the  program agreement. This instrument is addressed to large firms and industrial groups to 
promote the implementation of industrial large investment whose project plans have to be 
negotiated with the Public Administration.  
 
The instrument has new features with respect to the old ones. It is oriented to the attraction of 
domestic and international projects, which favours competition between areas and countries; 
by taken into account ex ante evaluation of positive and negative externalities of each project. 
Moreover, the Public Administration can address the choices of investment to produce social-
economic effects at national and local level.  
  
From the introduction of program agreements (Cipe Deliberation 28/5/1987) up to now, the 
instrument has been modified to answer to the transformation of productive sectors of the 
country and to assure a larger impact in the areas where the incentives are located. At the 
beginning, only large investments were financed; in the following years the instrument has 
been extended to the sector of tourism (Law 196/1997), agricultural and fishing (Legislative 
Decree 173/1998). A further important transformation is the extension to consortia of  small 
and medium enterprises and to industrial districts, which are important subjects of Italian 
economy (Cipe Deliberation, 21/3/1997). 
 
The carrying out of program agreements was problematic mainly for difficulties related to the 
implementing of adequate administrative procedures: the approval time of each project and 
the provision of financial resources were very long, especially in the first stage of the life 
cycle of the instrument (1986-1992). The difficulties were overcome by the improvement of 
the program agreement regulation. On the other hand, a faster instrument for private capital 
accumulation was defined (faster both in the approval phase and in the allocation of financial 
resources). The instrument was implemented by the Law 488/92. 
  
The main feature of Law 488/92 is to allocate subsidies through a “rationing” system based 
on  an  auction  mechanism  which  guarantees  compatibility  of  demand  and  supply  of 
incentives.  Subsidies  are  granted  on  the  basis  of  the  amount  of  the  funding  available.   4 
Interventions to be subsidised are selected on the basis of merit, identified by 3 indicators, in 
accordance with legislators’ evaluations
 4. The indicators are the following ones: 1) share of 
owner capital invested in the project; 2) number of new employees per unit of investment; 3) 
ratio between the maximum subsidy which can be allocated and that requested by the firm. In 
order to draw up rankings to grant subsidies, each application receives a score obtained by 
adding up the values of the single standardised and normalised indicators. The rankings are 
drawn up through the decreasing order of the score awarded to each project and the subsidies 
are allocated to projects until funding granted to each region is exhausted. These rankings are 
constructed at a regional level. There are also special rankings for large projects and reserved 
lists for small and medium-sized firms.  
 
There is a mechanism related to the amount of aids requested by the firm (with respect to 
threshold established by the European Union) which affects the possibility of  obtaining the 
incentive.  The lower the percentage requested, the greater the likelihood of receiving it), and this 
allows firms to influence the probability of obtaining the subsidy and the State to reduce the 
“rent” granted to the firm. By ranking and selecting projects and subsidies, the government  can 
stimulate projects with different earning capacities in different ways and maximize the number 
of subsidised investments with the overall amount of resources available.   
 
From 1992, the two instruments acted on the same areas of the South of Italy. It is not known 
to  what  extent  the  presence  of  program  agreements  has  favoured  the  growth  of  new 




3  Territorial  diffusion and concentration of the two instruments 
 
 
These two instruments are addressed to different typologies of firms: both kinds of incentives 
are specialized in different categories of projects (the program agreements are oriented to 
large and medium projects, the Law 488/92 to medium and small projects), and selection and 
allocation  process  of  both  instruments  support  this  choice.  Actually,  there  is  a  trade-off 
between the time lag of subsidies disbursement and the amount of the incentive. On the one 
hand  the  expenditure  schedule  of  Law  488/92  is  fixed  and  very  strict,  whereas  program 
agreements do not have a predetermined timetable for the benefit assignment. On the other 
hand, the procedure of handing over prescribed by  Law 488/92 implies a reduction of the 
amount of benefit with respect to the maximum allowable, large firms, without strong budget 
constraints,  prefer program agreement that instead allow the disbursement of the maximum 
incentives. The consequence is that the firm usually does not use both  instruments at the 
same time. The interaction among instruments  happens by the effects on behaviour of firms 
localized in the same region.  
 
The choice of policy makers to implement territorial growth policies using the same map 
designed for the allowance of EU structural financial funding and for the areas in derogation 
of concurrence policy following the articles 87.3.a and 87.3.c. has favoured the presence of 
both instruments on the same area. This is consistent to the principles of concentration of the 
State intervention as prescribed by EU regulation.  The concentration of different policies on 
                                                
4 There were three indicators in the period the empirical analysis refers to. Two more were added to them, 
subsequent to the intervention: an indicator linked to specific regional, sectorial or territorial priorities, and an 
indicator linked to the level of awareness of environmental issues.   5 
the same area favours the achievement of a sufficient agglomeration of firms required for the 
creation of positive externalities attracting new firms and promoting development process.  
 
The regional analysis by instrument shows that 561  (71,6%) of 784 Italian LLS have received 
incentives,  i.e.,  they  include at  least  one  municipality  in  which  subsidized  firms  by  Law 
488/92 or program agreement are located (Table 1).  
 
As expected, the LLS’s in which there is at least one intervention, are basically localized in 
the South of Italy: there are 332 subsidized LLS in the southern regions, (59.1% of the total). 
The territorial diffusion in the two areas is deeply different: in the Centre and North regions 
the LLS with incentives are the 54.7%  of the total, the 91% in the South. 
Therefore, the process of incentive concentration is under way  in the Central and Northern 
regions,  even  though  less  intensive  with  respect  to  the  southern  regions  it  is  almost 
nonexistent. The reason is mainly due to the map of eligible areas for incentives, that includes 
all southern regions and only some areas of the North-Centre. This indicates that, ex post, in 
the considered period, any action of concentration of the intervention in the South of Italy 
does not have any relevant effect. 
 
The  process  of  concentration  can  be  analyzed  also  by  the  exam  of  new  job  creation  by 
subsidized firms. The regional distribution of new employment by instrument is presented in 
Table 2. On the whole, completed  interventions have created 145,000 new jobs, a little more 
than  2%  of  industrial  occupation  in  2001  of  the  whole  country.  However,  the  industrial 
occupation represents, with 37,000 new  employed, only the 0,7% of industrial employment 




Table 1- Local labour systems by the presence/absence of  subsidized  firms (by program 
agreement and Law  488) by region (period 1996-2001) 
       
LLS GROUP   North-Centre  South   Italy  
No incentives   190  33  223 
Only Law  488/92  227  300  527 
Both instruments  2  32  34 
Total  419  365  784 
 
Table 2- New employment produced by program agreements and Law 488/92 in the local 
labour system by regions.  (number of workers). 
 
LLS GROUP   North-Centre  South   Italy  
No incentives   0  0  0 
Only Law  488/92  27247  53391  80638 
Both instruments  9685  54521  64205 
Total  36931  107911  144843 
Share %  North-Centre  South   Italy  
No incentives   0.0  0.0  0.0 
Only Law  488/92  73.8  49.5  55.7 
Both instruments  26.2  50.5  44.3 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
   6 
 
The analysis by instrument, showed in tables 3a and 3b, indicates that all program agreements 
insist on LLS where also Law 488/92 is present. Therefore, the territorial diffusion of state 
subsidized  policies  is  dominated  by  the  spatial  presence  of  the  Law  488/92,  particularly 
diffused in the South regions. 
 
The Law 488, in the period 1996-2001 has created about 123,000 new job, the 70% in the 
South (table 3a). Nearly 35% of employment are in the LLS where program agreements are 
also localized, showing a large overlap of the instruments also from the point of view of the 
extent of the intervention. 
 
The  subsidised  firms  of  Law  488/92  have  created  in  the  period  1996-2001  a  cumulative 
number of jobs equal to 1.8% of industrial occupation in 2001. The share increases to 6% in 
the South, showing that the contributing of incentives in these regions is very important, also 
without taking into account spill-over effects. 
 
The program agreement impact is lower than the 488/92 one. In the considered period the 
instrument has created over 22,000 new jobs, almost all (97%) in the South (table 3b). On the 
whole, the  program agreement have created the 0.3% of industrial employment in 2001, the 
1.5%  of the southern one. 
 
The analysis of program agreements has to consider the exceptional concentration of state 
aids in the local labour system of Melfi, caused by FIAT investments that attracted other 
investments for  mechanical component activities. The employment generated by program 
agreement are over 8,550; if we exclude Melfi’s LLS, the share of southern employment due 




Table 3a - New employment generated by Law 488/92 in the local labour system by regions.  
(number of workers). Year 2001. 
LLS GROUP  North-Centre  South  Italy 
No incentives   -  -  - 
Only Law  488/92  27,247  53,391  80,638 
Both instruments  9,256  32,768  42,023 
Total  36,502  86,158  122,661 
 
Share (%) of employment generated by Law 488/92 in the local labour system compared with 
domestic industrial employment of the year 2001. 
LLS GROUP  North-Centre  South  Italy 
No incentives   -  -  - 
Only Law  488/92  0,8  6,9  2,0 
Both instruments  4,0  5,2  4,9 
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Table 3b - New employment generated by program agreement  in the local labour system by 
territorial sections.  (number of employeed). Year 2001.  
LLS GROUP  North-Centre  South  Italy 
Absence of incentives  -  -  - 
Only Law  488/92  -  -  - 
Both incentives  429  21,753  22,182 
Total  429  21,753  22,182 
 
Share (%) of employment generated by program agreement  in the local labour system 
compared with domestic industrial employment of the year 2001. 
LLS GROUP  North-Centre  South  Italy 
Absence of incentives  -  -  - 
Only Law  488/92  -  -  - 
Both incentives  0.2  3.4  2.6 
Total  0.0  1.5  0.3 
 
 
The spatial distribution analysis of incentives examines if they are concentrated in some areas 
or they are randomly scattered. The notion of employment concentration generated by the 
above two incentives is ambiguous. In fact, it can be twofold: it can be related only to single 
LLS, that is, if new employment is equally distributed in the LLS, otherwise it is concentrated 
only in some LLS; it can be related to aggregation of SLL, i.e. if there are aggregation of 
adjacent LLS that show high levels of new employment, compared to agglomeration where 
there is a low level. The first notion can be quantified with a concentration index by LLS, as 




The Herfindhal index is presented in table 4. While in the North-Centre the distribution of 
State aids by Law 488/92 follows the geographical map defined by UE Commission, in the 
southern regions it follows the spatial concentration of total employment in the regions. The 
distribution of incentives is driven by a concentration process of firms by LLS rising in a 
spontaneous way:  this is due to the fact that there are non spatial options in the allocation of 
funding in these regions. Actually,  from the fourth rounds, regions introduced  area selection 
indicators, but the  spatial distribution of subsidized firms has only slightly changed.  
 
For  the  program  agreement  the  distribution  is  more  concentrated.  This  is  implicit  in  the 
feature of the instruments  that it is addressed to few, if big, incentives. Even if the LLS of 
Melfi is excluded, the Herfindahl concentration index is over three times  greater of the index 
referred to the Law 488/92. 
                                                
5  See Pellegrini (2004) for technical details.   8 
 
Table 3c - New employment  generated  by program agreements  in the local labour system (net 
Melfi’s LLS)  by territorial sections.  (number of workerd). Year 2001 
LLS GROUP  North-Centre  South  Italy 
Absence of incentives  -  -  - 
Only Law  488/92  -  -  - 
Both incentives  429  13.204  13.633 
Total  429  13.204  13.633 
Share (%) of employment generated by program agreements  in the local labour system (net 
Melfi’s LLS) compared with domestic industrial employment of the year 2001.  
LLS GROUP  North-Centre  South  Italy 
Absence of incentives  -  -  - 
Only Law  488/92  -  -  - 
Both incentives  0.2  2.1  1.6 
Total  0.0  0.9  0.2 
 
 
Table 4  -  Territorial concentration of employment by instrument (Herfindahl index by LLS) 
 
VARIABLES  HERFINDAHL INDEX 
New jobs  l. 488/92  0,023 
New jobs  PA (Program Agreement)  0,184 
New jobs  PA excluding Melfi LLS  0,081 
- total employment in Italy by LLS   0,026 
 
 
The spatial correlation analysis through Moran index for southern regions is shown in table 5. 
We observe a positive and significant spatial correlation of new jobs generated by l. 488/92 
that  is  greater  than  the  total  employment  correlation.  Therefore  the  degree  of  spatial 
agglomeration of l. 488/92 is higher than the naturally generated agglomeration. Actually, if 
we analyse the share of l. 488/92 employees compared to all of the employees using a Moran 
index,  we  notice  a  significant  and  even  higher  spatial  correlation.  This  agglomeration  is 




Table 5  - Spatial correlation of employees by instrument (Moran index by LLS) 
 
VARIABLES  MORAN INDEX   P-VALUE 
New employees  l. 488/92  0.078  0.000 
Share of new employees  l. 488/92 compared to total 
employees of LLS    0.193  0.000 
New employees  PA   -0.006  0.370 
Share of new employees  PA compared to total 
employees of LLS    -0.011  0.097 
- total employees for LLS  2001  0.045  0.000 
 
 
There  are  at  least  two  reasons  that  justify  this  spatial  diffusion  model  of  incentives:  the 
entrepreneurs can understand that there are positive benefits in localizing near LLS where are 
subsidized firms (or, on the contrary, negative localization factors can affect neighbours); the   9 
development of LLS can spread out “by contagion”, beginning from a LLS and  influencing 
adjacent LLS.  
This aspect describes a dynamic local development model, present in the recent literature 
(Pellegrini, 2004).  As expected, instead, the program agreements do not show statistically 
robust spatial correlation. The share of new employees of  program agreement compared to 




4. Methodology for evaluating territorial ex-post impact of subsidies 
 
The  methodology for  evaluating ex-post impact of  subsidies on a region is based on the 
analysis of the counterfactual scenario, following the recent literature on evaluation of public 
policy . However, the small number of LLS without policy intervention (in our case without 
the presence of incentive by Law 488/92) does not allow the use of the classical model where 
the counterfactual is  represented by a sample of not subsidized LLS.  
 
We meet three main problems that affect the evaluation of the impact of the two instruments:  
1.  identifying the effects of incentive separating from the (expected) growth of  LLS; 
2.  evaluating the impact of different amount  of incentives across LLS;  
3.  specifying the interaction between the two forms of incentives. 
  
The first problem is related to the presence of auto-selection: the subsidized firms choose to 
localize in areas where perspectives are higher; therefore larger growth could be caused not 
by the incentives but also by  the idiosyncratic features of these areas. In this case we can use 
econometric  strategies  based  on  the  knowledge  of  observable  and  not  observable  auto-
selection variables to remove the selection bias and find the correct impact coefficient. In the 
case of selection on not observable variables (that are considered constant in the period) the 
standard model is the difference-in differences estimator:
6  the analysis does not compare the 
level  of  performance  variable  but  its  difference  before  and  after  the  intervention,  across 
subsidized and not subsidized areas. In our case the simple differences could be misleading 
because  LLS  have  different  extension  (and  therefore  different  employment  levels).  We 
decided to use logarithmic differences, i.e. the growth rate of employment. The growth rates 
differentials are attributed to the features of each LLS, in particular the degree of structural 
development  level  and  cyclical  variables.  These  features  can  be  approximated  by  proxy 
observable variables considered in the model. 
   
An other important aspect for the specification of the evaluation model is the presence of an 
high spatial correlation across LLS that could influence the estimates. This correlation could 
be  representative  of  a  specific  territorial  development  model,  partially  influenced  by  the 
incentive, that has to be included in the analysis. From the econometric point of view, this 
means  considering  a  lagged  spatial  variable  or  a  spatial  error  model, to  be  chosen  using 
appropriate tests of spatial specification. 
 
The second problem is related to the choice of the correct parameterization of the intervention 
variable. The use of a simple flag to single out areas with or without incentive, as often used 
in the literature, is in our case not sufficient, because there is a inadequate number of LLS 
                                                
6 See  Blundell e Costa Dias (2000) e (2003) for technicalities.   10 
without incentives and also because there is a high variability across LLS of the amount of 
subsidies.   
 
Given the available data, the dimension of the subsidized investment has be approximated by 
the number of new workers, that is a signal of the amount of the intervention realized, under 
the  hypothesis of a linear relation between the number of new jobs and substitution effects or 
complementarities on the area
7. The use of logarithmic differences requires to normalize the 
number of new employees due to incentive to eliminate the effect of different dimensions. 
The adopted parameterization is to normalize the new created jobs by total employment of 
LLS  before    intervention.  This  facilitates  the  interpretation  of  the  coefficient  of  the 
intervention variable, because it represents the number of additional employees in the LLS 
when there is an increase of one unit in the number of employees due to subsidies. 
 
The model of the interaction is complicated by the fact  there are not LLS with program 
agreement and without incentive by Law 488/92.  Therefore it is not easy to identify the 
contribution of each instrument. We have chosen to evaluate three basic questions:  
1.  How much does the impact of  l.488/92 change if the effects of program agreements 
are included? 
2.  To what extent does the coefficient of  l.488/92 modify if it can change in the LLS 
with program agreement? 
3.  To what extent does the coefficient of l.488/92 modify if the interaction represented 
by the product of employment in the LLS with program agreement has been added? 
 
The base model is therefore specified by:  
 
(1)    (ln TE)t  = a +  b  (ln TE)t-1  +  γ Xt-1  + δ (intervention t /TE t-1  )  + φ (interaction t)  + ε t 
 
where TE is a vector of Nx1 observations of the dependent variable total employment 
for  LLS  (N=365),    X    is  a  matrix  Nxk    of  observations  of  the  exogenous  variables,  
intervention    is  the  new  employment  created  by  incentive  of  l.488/92  or  by  program 
agreement, interaction represents the variables that capture the interaction, a, b, γ, δ , φ are 
(Kx1) vectors of regression parameters, εt is a vector of homoschedastic  not  correlated and 
normal distributed error. The observables variables that capture the business cycle are the 
lagged dependent variable ( (ln TE)t-1 ) and the growth rate of value added in the services
8; 
those that capture the structural aspects are the employment share in agriculture at the time t-1 
and unemployment rate at the time t-1. It was also used an other dummy variable to single out 
a LLS with outlier value for the employment growth rate. The results are  presented in the 
table 6. 
This specification has been tested for the presence of spatial correlated errors or for a 
spatial lag model (LM test as proposed in Anselin, 2001). Both tests have strong positive 
value (table 7). 
The model is therefore estimated before in the form of spatial lag:  
 (2)  
  (ln TE)t  = a+ b  (ln TE)t-1  + γ Xt-1 + δ (intervention t /TE t-1  ) + φ (interaction t)+ rW  (ln TE)t  + ε t 
                                                
7 The test on the presence of non linear relation (COSUM test) was done. 
8 A similar variable was used in a paper of  Bondonio (2004).    11 
where W  (ln TE)t  is the spatial lagged endogenous variable (W is the adjacencies matrix, 
made by binary values, that have been calculated on the basis of the maximum distance, about 
46,5 km) and r  the autoregressive spatial parameter  
 
and in the form of spatial error model: 
 
(3)      (ln TE)t  = a +  b  (ln TE)t-1  + γ Xt-1  + δ (intervention t /TE t-1   + φ (interaction t)  + ε t 
          
with   ε t = lW ε t  + m t 
 
where l is the autoregressive spatial parameter and  mt  is a vector of homoschedastic and not 
correlated normally distributed errors. 
 
The models 2 and 3 have been estimated by LM (Anselin, 1988). The diagnostic test about the 
model includes simple and adjusted R-square, whereas, in the case of the models with spatial 
dependence, it presents the variance ratio ( a statistic similar to the R-square based on the 





The  working  of  the  model  requires  data  at  disaggregated  territorial  level,  sometimes  not 
available  from official sources. The statistical sources used are from the National Institute of 
Statistics (Istat) and from administrative sources. 
 
The following statistical sources have been considered: 
 
·  Istat, time series 1996-02 of domestic employment and value-added in the sector of 
agriculture, industry and services, at the territorial level of LLS; 
·  Istat, homogenous data of Industry and Service Census years 1991, 1996, 2001 related 
to  employees  of  local  unit,  in  the  LLS,  in  the  sector  of  agriculture,  industry  and 
services; 
·  Istat, data from the XIV Census of Population, year 2001; 
·  Istat, time series (estimate) 1998-02 resident employment and unemployed persons, at 
the territorial level of LLS; 
·  Istat, estimate of resident employment and unemployed persons, at the territorial level 
of LLS, year 1996. 
 
Administrative  database: 
 
·  Micro data base of program agreement, realized in the period 1987-2000, that contains 
investments  and  new  employees  by  program  agreement,  and  single  project  of 
investment at the level of municipality. Data have been taken from deliberation of 
Cipe  -  Inter  Ministerial  Committee  for  Economic  Planning  –  and  completed  with 
documents from Ministry of Productive  Activities. The database contains new job 
created by incentive and the value of investments in the LLS.  
·  The database of investments realized by the Law 488, contains data on investments 
and new actual job (they are not equal to the planned number) on the basis of the 
relation of concessionary banks, at the territorial level of LLS. 
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6 . Results 
 
The regression model (1) has been estimated: the growth rate 1996-2001 (pre-post) of total 
employment for LLS is related to the growth rate 1991-1996 of total employment and a set of 
exogenous variables for the 365 LLS in the South of Italy.  
 
The results of the OLS estimate (without spatial effects) are shown in table 6. The model 
without incentive has a good fit and significant parameters. We observe that the coefficient of 
unemployment rate is negative, showing the permanence of structural negative effects.  
 
Introducing  the  variable  taking  into  account  new  jobs  by  Law  488/92  normalized  with 
employee of the year 1996, we get a positive and significant coefficient equal to 0.46. The job 
creation by subsidies increases the total employment of about a half worker for each new job. 
The  transfer  is  not  complete  because  a  part  of  the  growth  “substitute”  job that  could  be 
created without incentive firms, cutting into half the net effect. 
 
The inclusion of the variable on program agreement coefficient has positive signs but are not 
significant.  Moreover,  the  net  effect  could  be  lower  than  that  of  Law  488.  Otherwise 
including both instruments, with two variables, we note an increase of the significance  and in 
the value of coefficient of program agreement, while the value of the coefficient for 488/92 is 
not different. 
 
Also the case of interaction is very interesting: if the coefficient of the l.488/92 changes in the 
LLS with program agreements, we obtain a positive and statistically significant coefficient, 
while the coefficient decreases in the LLS without program agreement. This implies that in 
the  LLS  there  is  an  effect  of  complementarities,  although  smaller,  between  the  two 
instruments. 
Moreover,  the  interaction  reduces  as  expected  the  specific  effect  of  the  l.488/92,  or  the  
coefficient that in the past included the effect of complementarities with program agreement. 
The measured interaction is defined as the product  between new employment created by the 
two instruments is always positive but not statistically significant. 
 
These results can be influenced by the presence of spatial correlation. The test, presented in 
table  7  show  as  it  is  possible  to  exclude  the  presence  of  a  model  with  residual  spatial 
correlation in all those estimated models. 
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Table 6 – estimate of linear regression model (dependent variable: growth rate of employee 1996-
2001) 
 
Variables  MOD.1  MOD.2  MOD.3  MOD.4  MOD.5  MOD.6 

































































Share of new employees  l. 488/92 (a)  - 
0.46 







Share of new  employees of program 




(1.74)  -  - 
Interaction: flag PA* (a)  -  -  -  - 
18.52 
(2.05)  - 
Interaction: (a)*(b)  -  -  -  -  - 
0.39 
(1.28) 
               
R
2  0.21  0.24  0.21  0.24  0.24  0.24 
Adjusted R
2   0.19  0.22  0.20  0.22  0.23  0.22 
Number of observations  365  365  365  365  365  365 
 
 
Models under two hypotheses  of the presence of lagged spatial variables (model with spatial 
lag)  and  the  presence  and  spatial  correlated  error  (model  with  spatial  error)  have  been 
estimated by ML. The results are in tables 8 and 9. 
 
In all the models the spatial coefficients are significant even though the probability is higher 
for spatial lag model than for correlated spatial error model. The results are similar to those of 
OLS estimates. In the whole there is a reduction of the coefficient for both the instruments: 
this is caused by the spatial interrelation that gets the spill-over between areas. 
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Table 7  - Test of spatial dependence for the model 
 
Test of spatial dependence  MOD.1  MOD.2  MOD.3  MOD.4  MOD.5  MOD.6 
Spatial Error              












               
Spatial lag              












*p-value between parentheses. 
 
Table 8 – Estimate of  regression model with spatial lag (dependent: growth rate of total 
employment 1996-2001). 
 
Variables  MOD.1  MOD.2  MOD.3  MOD.4  MOD.5  MOD.6 
































































Share of new employees  l. 488/92 (a)  - 
0.40 







Share of new  employees of program 




(1.61)  -  -  
Interaction: flag PA* (a)  -  -  -  - 
17.00 
(1.91)  -  
Interaction: (a)*(b) 
-  -  -  -  - 
0.38 
(1.30) 














               
Number observation  365  365  365  365  365  365 
Variance Ratio  0.22  0.25  0.23  0.25  0.25  0.25 
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Table 9 – Estimates error spatial model (dependent: growth rate of total employment 1996-2001) 
 
Variables  MOD.1  MOD.2  MOD.3  MOD.4  MOD.5  MOD.6 

































































Share of new employees  l. 488/92 (a)  - 
0.41 







Share of new  employees of program 




(1.61)  -  - 
Interaction: flag PA* (a)  -  -  -  - 
16.84 
(1.88)  - 
Interaction: (a)*(b) 
-  -  -  -  - 
0.38 
(1.29) 
               












               
Number of observation  365  365  365  365  365  365 




On the whole  the coefficient of Law 488/92 decreases up to 0.38-0.36, that of program 








In this paper we have focused on the evaluation of territorial interaction effects of the 
principal incentive instruments in the South of Italy, the Law 488/92 and program agreement. 
Special emphasis was put on the evaluation of employment effects in the local labour system 
of each instruments and on their interactions. The objective is twofold: firstly, the selection 
procedure of subsidies firms could  determine negative effects on not subsidized firms, with a 
general small effect in terms of employment in the local labour system, or even a negative 
effect; secondly, it could be the case in which the instruments are complementary and thus 
creating firms agglomeration and externalities for different investment extention; if this does 
not happen, they substitute one for another reducing the total effect in the area.   16 
 
The evaluation of employment impact is not simple because it requires to divide the economic 
and social dynamics from those effect due to a casual link with the incentives. 
The analysis is based on non experimental statistical methods at a disaggregated territorial 
level.  The  model  used  is  difference-in-differences  applied  to  the  case  of  heterogeneous 
territorial areas with respect to the dimension. 
 
Both instruments have a positive impact: the Law 488/92 has a significant contribution to the 
employment growth that change between 0.3 and 0.5 (0.4 with spatial effects).   
 
This means that for one hundred new employees created by the Law 488/92, about a third or a 
half represents the net impact of the incentive. It is a relevant effect that points out the utility 
of the instrument. 
 
The power of creating new employment with program agreements is lower than the one Law 
488/92, and statistically less significant. This depends mainly on the exiguity of observations, 
making  the estimates less accurate and on the peculiarity of the instrument, more occasional, 
with long period for the realization that could have had an influence on the additionality, and 
also for the difficulty of the economic cycle for large enterprises.  
 
The  more  interesting  aspect  is  the  analysis  of  complementarities  relation  or  substitution 
between the instrument. Also if the analysis considers only the southern regions, the two 
instruments are on the same LLS, in fact there are not LLS with program agreement that do 
not have also incentive by l.488/92.     
 
Both instruments have the tendency to  generate concentrations (in  particular the program 
agreement, for their nature) and agglomerations (in particular the l.488/92 that can spread on 
the territory following a contiguity model). The interactions are positive, even if not too high: 
in the areas where there are program agreement, the generation coefficient of  l.488/92 is 
higher.  
It  is  difficult  to  calculate  the  marginal  increase  of  the  impact,  because  there  is  not  the 
possibility to measure the impact of program agreement separated from the one Law 488/92. 
The estimates show that the whole effect could be equal to the sum of each single effect.  
 
This paper indicates that Italian industrial policies have a positive employment impact and 
therefore they could be considered good instruments for the economic policy. This result can 
be  enforced  by  a  robustness  exercise,  that  considers  the  sector  aspects  and  use  other 
econometrics techniques.  These aspects will be considered in a future paper.   17 
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